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1The Military Operation of the EU in Chad and 
the Central African Republic: Good Policy, Bad Politics
HYLKE DIJKSTRA
2010
This is the final electronic version of an article published in:
International Peacekeeping 17(3): 395-407
Abstract.  This article evaluates the military operation of the European Union in Chad and the 
Central  African  Republic  in  2008-09.  Despite  a  promising  conceptual  approach  and  close 
cooperation  with  the  United  Nations  (UN),  the  operation  created  signiﬁcant  political  problems 
between member states. It led to a split – France arguing that it carried too much of the burden and 
Germany and the United Kingdom sensing that they were sponsoring a pet project. When the UN 
failed  to  achieve  its  ambitious  promises  to  establish  a  parallel  presence  and  follow-on  force, 
tensions arose with the UN as well. This type of operation is therefore unlikely to be repeated in the 
near future. 
In January 2008, the European Union (EU) launched a military operation in eastern Chad and the 
Central African Republic (CAR) for the duration of exactly one year (EUFOR Tchad/RCA). Its 
mandate was to contribute to protecting refugees from the Darfur region and internally displaced 
people,  to facilitate  the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to contribute to the protection of UN 
personnel.1 The operation, in other words, contributed to a 'safe and secure environment'. It was 
innovative  in  that  it  joined  up  with  the  United  Nations  (UN)  Mission  in  the  Central  African 
Republic  and Chad (MINURCAT),  which  focused among other  things  on  the  training  of  local 
police, as part of a broader international multidimensional presence. After the one-year mandate 
expired, MINURCAT took over the military component. It became responsible for all facets of the 
multidimensional presence. After the handover, it was able to benefit from the improvements in the 
infrastructure made by EUFOR, the military structures that had been put in place, the rehatting of 
some 2,200  troops  and  continuous  logistical  support.2 Rather  than  building  an  operation  from 
scratch, MINURCAT thus took over a well-functioning mission and was operational from day one.
This type of 'bridging operation', where the EU prepares the ground for the UN, is promising 
on a conceptual level.3 On paper the EU is more capable of rapid force generation than the UN. It 
also has the capabilities to professionally deploy troops to difficult areas of operation, where it can  
set  up  camp and declare  initial  operational  capability  quickly.  The  idea  of  a  multidimensional 
1 UN Security Council Resolution 1778, article 6(a).
2 EUFOR, Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Paris: Mont Valérien, 2009.
3 In 2003 the EU had carried out the much smaller and shorter Operation Artemis, to prepare the ground for the UN in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As a result, bridging operations were mentioned as one of the models for 
EU–UN cooperation in European Council, Presidency Report on EU–UN Co-operation in Military Crisis  
Management Operations: Elements of Implementation of the EU–UN Joint Declaration, Brussels, 2004. See also 
Thierry Tardy, 'EU–UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping: A Promising Relationship in a Constrained Environment', in 
Martin Ortega (ed.), The EU and the UN: Partners in Effective Multilateralism, Paris: EU Institute for Security 
Studies, 2005, pp.49–68.
2presence  furthermore  fits  very  well  with  the  so-called comprehensive  approach,  which  the  EU 
cherishes. In addition,  cooperation with the UN and 'effective multilateralism' rank high among 
European priorities.4 From a military-strategic and operational perspective, this one-year bridging 
mission was also quite a success. Never before had the EU sent so many troops to such a distant 
theatre, located some 4,500km from Brussels and 2,000km from the nearest seaport.5 It overcame 
these logistical challenges. This was a major achievement. In addition, EUFOR had to operate as an 
impartial actor in a local political minefield. Despite strong suspicions that it was supporting the 
incumbent regime, EUFOR carried out its balancing act surprisingly well.6
Despite a promising concept and effective military implementation, EUFOR was marked by 
significant political problems in Brussels and New York. Within the EU, the operation created a 
split between three powerful member states. Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) saw it as 
another pet project  in support of  Françafrique.  While they eventually decided not to block the 
operation, they made clear that they would not contribute any forces and would keep the common 
costs to an absolute minimum. When these costs increased,  and only French companies locally 
benefited from European tenders, this led to frustrations on the side of Germany and the UK. As a 
result, they have lost their appetite for further French initiatives. France, for its part, was happy to  
make a major contribution, but it expected more from the other member states, including Germany 
and the UK, which had been vocal about the Darfur situation (which was spilling over into Chad 
and the CAR). Most other member states were averse to participation. This demonstrated to France 
a lack of commitment to an ambitious European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). As will be 
shown, it meant that France carried a much larger than foreseen military and financial burden.
Similarly, this operation created significant political tensions in the relationship between the 
EU and the UN. Either  the UN did not  meet  its  promises,  or the Europeans had made overly 
ambitious planning assumptions about the UN's capabilities. In fact MINURCAT was so slow in its 
force generation and the training of local police that during most of the deployment of EUFOR 
there was no parallel police presence. This created a security vacuum within the refugee camps, for 
which  EUFOR had  not  planned.  Equally  problematic  was  that  the  UN did  not  do  its  military 
planning and force generation in time for the handover. In part this reflected the resistance of the 
Chadian government to a UN peacekeeping operation, but the result was that the EU had to press 
the UN to get  its work done.  As EU documents point out,  'the  exit  strategy from [a bridging] 
operation is the arrival, in time, of a UN force'.7 Despite official rhetoric that cooperation had been 
'exemplary', the handover was considered by the EU a 'nightmare', which came at the cost of good 
relations.8
As  a  consequence  of  these  political  problems  such  a  large-scale  bridging  operation  is 
unlikely to be repeated in the near future.9 This is unfortunate for various reasons. First, as pointed 
out above, it was a conceptually attractive model. Second, the EU and the UN reached new levels of  
4 European Council, A Secure European in a Better World [European Security Strategy], Brussels, 2003. For a more 
sceptical view see, Bruno Charbonneau, 'What Is So Special about the EU? EU–UN Cooperation in Crisis 
Management in Africa', International Peacekeeping, Vol.16, No.4, pp.546–61.
5 Bjoern Seibert, 'African Adventure? Assessing the EU's Military Intervention in Chad and the Central African  
Republic', Massachusetts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program Working Paper, Nov. 2007.
6 Critics argue that EUFOR was not impartial because it gave the Chadian government the possibility to regroup. 
Charbonneau (see n.4 above); Patrick Berg, 'EUFOR Tchad/RCA: The EU Serving French Interests', in Muriel 
Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (eds), The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence, Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2009, pp.57–69. But President Déby's repeated annoyance with EUFOR for 
allowing anti-government rebels free passage and conversations between the French force commander and the  
French government on the conduct of the operation suggest that EUFOR was impartial (interviews with national, 
Council Secretariat and Commission officials in Brussels, autumn 2009, early 2010).
7 European Council (see n.3 above), para.10.
8 Martin Palouš, 'EU Presidency Statement on the Situation in Chad, the Central African Republic and the Subregion', 
UN Security Council, 24 April 2009; interviews with officials in Brussels, Jan. 2010.
9 The Lisbon Treaty may make day-to-day relations between the EU and the UN easier through a more prominent EU 
presence in New York, but it is unlikely to resolve the problems of a political nature.
3cooperation  through  joint  fact-finding  missions  and  substantial  coordination  during  the  initial 
planning of the multidimensional presence. It is worth noting that, as part of the comprehensive 
approach, the European Commission paid for much of the MINURCAT police-training mission. 
Third, the political tensions were partly the result of poor understanding between the participants. 
This article traces in detail the EUFOR policy process. It starts with the agenda-setting phase and 
concludes with the handover. It pays particular attention to the political dynamics of the operation. 
Analyses  of  the  military  planning  process,  the  tremendous  logistical  challenges  and  the  actual 
implementation are available elsewhere.10 
Agenda-setting
The  conflict  in  Darfur  has  been  on  international  agendas  since  early  2003.  The  Sudanese 
government was, however, extremely effective in undermining any type of international response. 
The  conflict  led  to  approximately  250,000 refugees  leaving for  eastern  Chad,  where  they  met 
another 185,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), who had been displaced by internal armed 
conflict and inter-ethnic violence.11 Yet the border between Darfur and eastern Chad is porous and 
they did not find a safe and secure environment there either. It was, in this context, that the UK and 
France  asked  the  UN  Department  of  Peacekeeping  Operations  (DPKO)  to  start  planning  an 
international multidimensional presence, which it did during the autumn of 2006 and early 2007.12 
In its proposed plan, MINURCAT would comprise 10,900 personnel to create a safe and secure 
environment in the surroundings of the camps, carry out humanitarian tasks and train local Chadian 
police to guarantee minimal security within the camps. These plans were in an advanced stage, 
when the Chadian President, Idriss Déby, made it clear that the military part of the presence would 
not be welcome in his country.13 
France had made a defence arrangement with Chad after its independence, had established a 
permanent bilateral military presence (Operation  Epervier) in 1986, and had a vested interest in 
Chad's stability.14 With the French presidential elections and the appointment of Bernard Kouchner 
as foreign minister in May 2007, the Darfur conflict resumed its domestic significance in France. 
On his second day in office, 19 May, Kouchner convened a meeting to discuss various options. 15 
These were subsequently communicated to European partners on 21 May, in what one interviewee 
recalls as a ‘vague document'. France furthermore requested an 'options paper' before the following 
Council of Ministers meeting in June.16 Germany, which at the time held the EU presidency, tried to 
keep the issue off the agenda due to other priorities, such as the final settlement of the constitutional  
debate. But France was persistent and at the end of May invited representatives from the Council 
Secretariat  and  the  European  Commission  to  its  national  military  headquarters  in  Paris  for  a 
10 Alexander Mattelaer, 'The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations: The Case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA', 
Working Paper No.5, Institute for European Studies, 2008; Seibert (see n.5 above); Berg (see n.6 above); Damien 
Helly, 'EUFOR Tchad/RCA: The EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African 
Republic (Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA)', in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (eds), European 
Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999–2009), Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009, 
pp.339–52; Oxfam, 'Mission Incomplete: Why Civilians Remain at Risk in Eastern Chad', Briefing Paper No.119, 
Oxfam, 2008.
11 International Crisis Group, 'Chad: A New Conflict Resolution Framework', Africa Report, No.144, 2008; 
International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 'Chad: IDPs in the East Facing Continuing Violence and Hardship’, 
21 Dec. 2009.
12 UN Security Council, 'Minutes of 5478th Meeting of the UN Security Council', 29 June 2006.
13 UN, 'Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic', UN doc., S/2007/488, 10 Aug.  
2007.
14 For French foreign policy in Chad, see Bruno Charbonneau, 'France', in David Black and Paul Williams (eds), The 
International Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of Darfur, London: Routledge, 2010, pp.213–31.
15 'Darfur is Kouchner's First “Guest” at Quai d'Orsay', Liberation, (Paris) 21 May 2007.
16 Interviews with Council Secretariat officials in Brussels, Dec. 2009, Jan 2010.
4preliminary briefing and to devise a comprehensive plan of action.17 Kouchner also met Déby on 10 
June,  and  a  UN  Security  Council  delegation,  which  visited  Chad  at  that  time,  was  told  that 
'following discussions with Mr. Kouchner the President had agreed, in principle, to the deployment 
of an international military presence in eastern Chad composed of French and other EU forces … a 
UN military presence … could eventually be discussed as a second phase of a UN deployment'.18 
The idea of a bridging operation thus gradually took shape.
The moment that  Portugal  took over the EU presidency from Germany in July 2007,  a 
EUFOR intervention was revived. The Council Secretariat was as ambitious as France, because of a 
bureaucratic  interest  in  launching  further  operations,  and  presented  the  member  states  with  an 
indicative timetable for the military planning, which led to the adoption of the operational plan in 
October.19 Some of the other member states were clearly in less of a hurry. As a first step, they 
tasked the Council Secretariat and the Commission to draft a joint options paper to be presented to  
the Council in July. Officials in the Council Secretariat used the paper to focus attention squarely on 
eastern Chad and the CAR in order to support the activities of the UN. At the same time, they 
discarded other less realistic options (such as humanitarian corridors and no-fly zones), which were 
unlikely to receive Security Council blessing.20 France used the opportunity of the options paper to 
volunteer  to  be  Framework  Nation,  providing some 40 per  cent  of  the  troops  and  making  its 
Operation Headquarters available. It noted, however, that one of the other member states would 
have to accept the responsibility of operation commander.21 Germany and the UK made explicitly 
clear that while they would not block an operation, they would also not contribute to it.
Decision-making
The joint Council Secretariat–Commission options paper of 13 July 2007 can be seen as the start of  
the decision-making process. The member states, however, never explicitly stated that action by the 
EU in eastern Chad was appropriate and that the Council Secretariat could thus start planning a 
military operation.22 Instead, all sorts of informal discussions were taking place over the summer in 
Brussels and the national capitals. With Germany and the UK stating that they would not contribute 
to this operation, France approached other member states about their willingness to make troops 
available. By putting the position of operation commander on the table, which was unprecedented in 
the European context, France hoped to offer a sweetener to other states. Swedish Foreign Minister 
Carl Bildt initially showed a keen interest in the operation, and France (mistakenly) read this as a 
signal that Sweden might make the Swedish-led Nordic Battle Group of 1,500 troops available. 23 
But after a visit to the region in early September, Bildt announced that Sweden would not contribute 
the  Battle  Group  or  accept  the  position  of  operation  commander,  as  the  mission  was  more 
challenging than expected.
However, the prospect of EUFOR had gained momentum due to French lobbying, and at the 
end of  August  an  EU-led fact-finding  mission  consisting  of  various  officials  from the  Council 
Secretariat, the Commission and the UN (comprising policy, planning, logistical and intelligence 
17 Interview in Brussels, 2010. The General Secretariat of the Council is the main body responsible in the EU for early 
military planning. See Hylke Dijkstra, 'The Council Secretariat's Role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy', 
European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.13, No.2, 2008, pp.149–66; Hylke Dijkstra, 'Explaining Variation in the Role 
of the EU Council Secretariat in First and Second Pillar Policy-Making', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.17, 
No.4, 2010, pp.527–44.
18 UN (see n.13 above), paras.23, 25.
19 Interview with national officials in Brussels, Nov. 2009, Feb 2010; the adoption of the Operational Plan is the last 
stage of the planning process, after which the operation is directly launched.
20 Mattelaer (see n.10 above); interview with Council Secretariat official in Brussels, Dec. 2009.
21 René Rouquet and Ruhi Acikgöz, 'The European Union Mission in Chad: EUFOR Tchad/RCA', Explanatory 
Memorandum of the Assembly of the WEU, 6 May 2008, para.72.
22 Mattelaer (see n.10 above); interview with national official in Brussels, Feb. 2010.
23 Interview with national official in Brussels, Feb. 2010.
5officers) went to eastern Chad and the CAR to analyse the situation.24 While in terms of EU–UN 
cooperation, this was quite a milestone, one interviewee from the Council Secretariat noted that,  
'because [DPKO] had done the planning, they thought that we would do exactly the same. They 
wanted us to do the military part and they would do all the rest. It took us some time to explain to 
them that we would do it differently'.25 Another interviewee stated that 'some people said about the 
operation that we were providing the security umbrella for the UN to perform … on the UN side 
they also had too high expectations of us, for example that we would provide them with escorts. But 
this was not our role, we were not their drivers.'26 The fact-finding mission nevertheless led to the 
adoption of the Crisis Management Concept on 12 September 2007, the first formal EU planning 
document.
Another internal milestone for the EU during this early planning phase was the cooperation 
between the Council Secretariat and the Commission. Because the Commission had been involved 
in the process since the very beginning, it was in a position to make accompanying funds available 
up  to  some  €35  million,  in  addition  to  the  annual  €30  million  it  was  already  spending  on 
humanitarian  aid  in  eastern  Chad  and  the  CAR.  Most  important  in  this  respect  was  the 
Commission's  financial  support  for  the MINURCAT police-training mission.  Before the  end of 
2007, it transferred €10 million to a trust fund; this was the bulk of the initial funding that allowed 
the UN to go ahead. The remaining €25 million were spent on medium-term development projects.  
Given that in all previous EU military operations combined the Commission had provided only 
about €1 million, its early involvement in EUFOR led to a truly comprehensive plan.
After the Crisis Management Concept, the EU had to formally adopt the Military Strategic 
Options. Four options were issued by the Council Secretariat on 12 September. Two of these were 
politically unfeasible, while the third created logistical problems. Thus the remaining option – to 
deploy four battalions at once – was quickly accepted on 4 October.27 All the options had included a 
preliminary  reference  to  the  common  costs  of  the  operation,  including  the  running  of  the 
headquarters  and  costs  relating  to  infrastructure,  that  were  to  be  borne  by  all  member  states 
proportional  to  their  gross  national  income  irrespective  of  whether  they  provided  troops.  The 
EUFOR common costs  were substantial,  but  when during the  drafting of  the Joint  Action,  the 
formal legal basis of the operation, the amount significantly increased Germany and the UK, as 
non-troop-contributing states, demanded an explanation. Their ministers had agreed to the amounts 
mentioned  in  the  Military  Strategic  Options  and they were  now faced with  an  unpleasant  fait 
accompli. This led to a heated debate over money at  ambassador level,  where all  proposals by 
France to increase the scope of the common costs were rejected.28
The financial disputes grew more serious over time. While the Joint Action agreed on €99.2 
million in common costs, this rose to €120 million in the Operation Commander's first budget. The 
total combined costs of the operation, which included the individual contributions of member states 
made  through  their  troop  contributions,  increased  from  an  estimate  of  €450  million  to 
approximately €1 billion in November 2008.29 It is virtually impossible to calculate the expenses per 
member state, but France clearly accounted for the largest burden. Assuming a proportional cost 
model, and the initial French objective to contribute 40 per cent of the troops, the first estimation of 
costs must have been in the range of €200 million for France. Given that it eventually contributed 
over 50 per cent of the troops, it must have paid around €500 million for the operation instead. 
24 Interviews with Council Secretariat, European Commission and UN officials in Brussels and telecons, Jan. 2010.
25 Interview with Council Secretariat official, Dec. 2009.
26 Interview with Council Secretariat official, Jan. 2010.
27 Option One was to train Chadian troops to provide security, which conflicted with the EU's impartiality requirement. 
Option Two was to deploy gradually, which was impossible because of the rainy season. Option Three was to deploy 
at once. Option Four was to focus mainly on the CAR, which was not what the member states wanted. Option Three 
was thus adopted. Mattelaer (see n.10 above).
28 France had hoped to move some individual costs to common costs in order to reduce its financial burden.
29 Helly (see n.10 above).
6From a French perspective, it was thus frustrating that while its national contribution went up by  
some €300 million,  the other member states refused to include the cost of basic items, such as 
drinking water for the soldiers, under the common costs.30
In parallel with discussions over the military options in the EU, there was a debate in New 
York on the Security Council resolution authorizing EUFOR to deploy. In retrospect, this became 
the single most important document for the operation. Within the EU, the assumption had always 
been that EUFOR was a one-year bridging operation, after which MINURCAT would take over the 
military tasks. This end-date concept was attractive to most member states, not least Germany and 
the UK, who feared open-ended common cost increases. In all internal EU documents, it is crystal 
clear that EUFOR would leave exactly one year after initial deployment. The Chadian government, 
on  the  other  hand,  was  not  yet  willing  to  have  a  peacekeeping operation  on  its  territory.  The 
Security Council resolution therefore had to be drafted with great skill to satisfy the EU member 
states as well as the Chadian government. In order to placate Chad, it was decided to postpone final 
decisions about the handover to a Mid-Mandate Review.31 France and the Council Secretariat were 
pleased with the results, because EUFOR could go ahead. But the EU did not get any guarantees 
about a follow-on force in Resolution 1778.32
Following the Military Strategic Options and Sweden's rejection of the position of operation 
commander, the EU organised an informal force generation conference on 24 September. Alexander 
Mattelaer describes it as a 'disaster'.33 Apart from France, very few states were willing to contribute 
personnel, and President Nicholas Sarkozy had to call his counterparts in Europe. The position of 
operation commander was offered to Ireland during an informal meeting of defence ministers on 
28–9 September.34 Ireland had so far  been absent  from the  debates  –  and the  future  operation 
commander, Lt. Gen. Pat Nash, had left for a golfing holiday in South Africa and had to be recalled.  
In addition to the command position Ireland contributed some 500 troops. Sarkozy's phone calls 
also had success with Poland, which made a similar contribution. Other member states contributed 
smaller contingents, with the total almost adding up to the required number of troops.
However, the main problem in terms of force generation was with the 'enablers' (tactical air 
transport,  medical  facilities  and  other  logistical  support).35 Robust  types  of  military  transport 
helicopters that could operate in eastern Chad were in short supply or already committed to other 
operations. Medical facilities had to be of a high standard and contributions were expensive. Given 
the logistical challenges of launching an operation in the middle of Africa, total contributions were 
still short of requirements after four force generation conferences. Participants 'felt a break/make 
moment'.36 During the fifth, and final, conference, France decided to make up most of the shortfalls 
(including 520 troops for logistical support).37 On this basis, Lt. Gen. Nash decided to launch the 
operation while noting that 'it was not a luxury plan'.38 One other observer commented that ‘he had 
to take a risk … if you are waiting for all ducks to be lined up in the pond, it would never happen'.39 
Only after a contributing 'third state', the Russian Federation, made four helicopters available (and 
operational in January 2009) could EUFOR operate more comfortably.
30 Interview in Brussels, Jan. 2010.
31 UN Security Council Resolution 1778, article 10.
32 Interview with Council Secretariat official in Brussels, Dec. 2009.
33 Mattelaer (see n.10 above), p. 17.
34 Interview with national official in Brussels, Oct. 2009.
35 Telephone interview with Operation Headquarters official, Dec. 2009.
36 Ibid.
37 Interview with national official in Brussels, Nov. 2009.
38 Interview with Operation Headquarters official in Brussels, Jan. 2010.
39 Telephone interview with Operation Headquarters official, Dec. 2009.
7Implementation
As for the implementation of the operation (with initial operating capability declared on 15 March 
2008), it is important to note that the objectives of the EU were very modest. This was only to be 
expected given that EUFOR was in Chad for one year, that it had only 3,700 troops available to  
ensure a safe and secure environment for refugees, that it never had sufficient tactical airlift and that  
its area of operations was nearly 350,000 km2. In this respect it is difficult to assess success. A 
positive appraisal came from Oxfam, which noted in an early report that it 'believes that EUFOR 
has made many civilians feel safer through its activities, which include patrolling known dangerous 
routes, destroying unexploded ordnance, making contact with local leaders, and positioning itself 
defensively around civilians during rebel  and government fighting'.40 This view was echoed by 
other non-governmental organizations (NGOs).41
However, others have pointed out that EUFOR was unable to protect the refugees, IDPs and 
humanitarian workers.42 But during most of its deployment there was no local parallel Chadian 
police force to provide even minimal security in the refugee camps. As part of the international  
multidimensional presence, MINURCAT was supposed to deploy police trainers to eastern Chad. It 
had, however, its own problems with the force generation of these trainers and the recruitment and 
the training of police took a long time. Only on 24 October 2008 were the first 29 local police 
officers deployed to the camps.43 Five months later, and thus after the handover, 667 local police 
officers had been deployed, still short of the target of 850.44 In other words, the EU had made overly 
ambitious planning assumptions, for the UN could not meet its promised policing target.
This caused serious difficulties for EUFOR. The division of labour had, after all, been that 
whereas EUFOR would be in charge of contributing to a safe and secure environment outside the 
camps,  the  local  police  would  provide  basic  security  within  them.  Banditry  and  human rights 
violations continued inside the camps and people expected EUFOR – being the only security actor 
present – to deal with it. But as a military force EUFOR had planned for armed confrontations with 
gangs of 100–200 people,  not groups of two to four committing crimes within the camps. The 
dilemma was made public by the force commander in Chad, Brig. Gen. Jean-Philippe Ganascia.
There is a discrepancy between what contributed to the initial set-up of the forces deployed 
here and the actual reality. The background situation has changed enormously … It is 
therefore essential that we adapt our methods of action in order to counteract the coupeurs 
de route [highwaymen] whilst still remaining within the framework we were given.45 
While EUFOR could not entirely solve this problem with the means available, it did make some 
adaptations.46 Women and children being the main victims of human rights violations, it emphasised 
gender issues, for example. EUFOR also started to target areas where crime levels were high with  
intensive  patrolling  for  a  few weeks  using  its  troops.  Of  course  EUFOR could  not  provide  a 
continuous,  semi-permanent  presence and had to keep on the move.47 The increased number of 
incidents, which had a large impact on the refugees and IDPs, is held as evidence of EUFOR’s 
40 Oxfam (see n.10 above).
41 Helly (see n.10 above).
42 Berg (see n.6 above).
43 UN, 'Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic', UN doc., S/2008/760, 4 Dec.  
2008.
44 UN, 'Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic', UN doc., S/2009/199, 14 April  
2009.
45 In an article in Le Figaro, 16 June 2008, cited by Oxfam (see n.10 above), pp.24–5.
46 Telephone interview with Operation Headquarters official, Dec. 2009.
47 Ibid.
8failure.48 Yet EUFOR was not prepared for policing tasks and inefficient UN deployment was the 
major cause of the problem that EUFOR was uncomfortable dealing with.
Termination and Handover
Before EUFOR could declare full operating capability on 17 September 2008 it started the Mid-
Mandate Review process, which would eventually lead to the termination of the operation and the 
handover to MINURCAT on 15 March 2009.49 This process was conducted jointly by the EU and 
the UN during a trip to the region (19–25 June 2008).50 Officials from both organizations discussed 
the review's terms of reference, and subsequently wrote separate reports: one by Javier Solana for 
the  UN  Secretary-General  and  the  other  by  the  Secretary-General  of  the  UN  to  the  Security 
Council.51 The reports were discussed by the UN Security Council on 24 September 2008 on the 
occasion of the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1834, which started the handover process.
Javier  Solana,  Bernard  Kouchner,  and  the  Belgian  Foreign  Minister,  Karel  de  Gucht, 
attended  the  meeting.  This  was  quite  remarkable,  as  the  Security  Council  normally  meets  at 
ambassador level. Javier Solana had not been overly involved in the EUFOR operation, and, apart  
from a visit to Chad in May 2008 and the attendance of the ceremony for the EU's first casualty in 
Paris, he had been largely absent from the whole process. However, because it was in the EU's 
interests to get out of Chad by the envisaged date of 15 March 2009, this message had to be clearly 
communicated to the UN. Given that the deployment of police trainers by MINURCAT was already 
far behind schedule, the Mid-Mandate Review was an appropriate time to reinforce the deadline. 
During his intervention, Solana noted that
EUFOR will leave on the 15th of March 2009. Our concern is to prevent a security gap at 
that moment. For this reason, I believe it is fundamental to insist on [these] aspects: an 
appropriate handover of the EUFOR by UN is an absolute necessity by the 15th of March 
2009 … a quick decision from the Security Council is needed. It will enable the UN to start 
its planning on time. We will do our best to support the UN in all areas and thus to make of 
this transition a success.52
UN Security Council Resolution 1834 asked for a report of the Secretary-General by 15 November 
on 'the planning and conducting preparations … of the proposed UN military presence in the north-
eastern Central  African Republic to  take over  EUFOR's presence',  and a final  decision on that 
matter on 15 December.53
With less than six months to the eventual handover, there was little time for the UN to do the 
planning and to raise sufficient forces for its operation. It did, however, send almost immediately a 
technical assessment mission to the region (6–13 October 2008).54 This was followed by the Under 
Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (13–15 October), by intense discussions in New 
York with the Chadian Permanent  Representative,  by visits by the Under Secretary-General  for 
Field Support (3–6 November) and by the Military Adviser for Peacekeeping Operations (12–14 
November).55 However, President Déby remained reluctant to allow UN peacekeepers into Chad 
48 Berg (see n.6 above).
49 EUFOR declared the elements deployed as fully operational, but they never actually reached full operating 
capability because the force generation process was never completed as a result of a lack of enablers.
50 UN, 'Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic', UN doc., S/2008/601, 12 Sept.  
2008.
51 Interview with Council Secretariat official in Brussels, Jan. 2010.
52 Javier Solana, 'Intervention de Javier SOLANA sur EUFOR Tchad/RCA', UN Security Council, 24 Sept. 2008 
(author's trans.).
53 Articles 8, 10.
54 UN, 'Report of the Secretary-General' (see n.43 above).
55 Ibid.
9and raised objections in all discussions. Only after a meeting with Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon 
on 26 November did he agree to a much smaller presence than foreseen in the UN.56 The UN 
Secretary-General's report arrived three weeks late on 4 December. The Security Council could only 
adopt  Resolution 1861,  which finally  decided on the handover,  on 14 January 2009,  only two 
months before the handover had to take place.
It is worth noting that in addition to the reluctance of the Chadian government, despite all 
the visits to Chad by senior UN officials, it was felt in the EU that the UN 'did not have an appetite 
to do the operation'.57 Another interviewee from the Council Secretariat similarly noted that
the UN spent all its time trying not to take over the operation. We tried, on the other hand, to 
make it effective on the day as scheduled. It was really difficult to get the UN involved. We 
used all the levers, with the Solana report, with [the Under-Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping Operations] coming to Brussels.58
Given that nothing about the handover had been formally mentioned in the initial Security Council 
Resolution 1778, the EU was in an awkward position. When it appeared that the UN would not be 
ready for the handover, the UN maintained that it was the EU's problem. This was disputed and, as 
one observer notes, the 'French effectively forced them … they forced DPKO to get in. It also came 
at the cost of good relations'. The handover was considered a 'nightmare'.59
There were three reasons why the handover eventually took place on time. First, various 
states contributing to EUFOR were persuaded by the Operation Headquarters to rehat some of their 
troops to  be  part  of  the  MINURCAT operation,  at  least  for  a  short  time. 60 On the  day of  the 
handover  about  60  per  cent  of  EUFOR,  some  2,200  troops,  moved  to  MINURCAT.  Second, 
EUFOR continued to provide logistical support to MINURCAT for the beginning of its operation. 
Third, EUFOR decided to hand over all the infrastructure and assets to the Chadian authorities in 
line with the Status of Forces Agreement. This would create a point of no return, because without 
infrastructure and assets EUFOR could no longer fulfil its mandate. MINURCAT, in turn, had to 
negotiate with the Chadian government about making use of the infrastructure. An optimum process 
would have been for the EU to hand it over directly to the UN, but given the lateness of the new 
Security Council resolution this was not possible. Following the provisions of the original Status of 
Forces Agreement was, in the words of one interviewee, 'the safest way to ensure that [EUFOR] 
could leave' on 15 March 2009.
Handing over the infrastructure to the Chadian government, however, created one specific 
problem. As part of an informal gentlemen's agreement, the EU had negotiated with the UN that  
MINURCAT  would  pay  part  of  the  costs  that  EUFOR  had  invested  in  upgrading  the  local 
infrastructure (such as military camps). This was in total €70 million and was part of the common 
costs. However, nothing had been put in writing and in the final calculations the EU used a different 
depreciation model than the UN. Eventually, the UN paid for only 20 per cent of the €70 million. 61 
The episode not only illustrates the tensions in the relationship with the UN; it also shows the 
political problems within the EU. Since the infrastructure was paid via the common costs, the non-
payment affected Germany most, which had had great reservations about the operation in the first 
place.
56 UN Security Council, 'Minutes of 6042nd Meeting of the UN Security Council', 12 Dec. 2008.
57 Interview in Brussels, Jan. 2010.
58 Interview with Council Secretariat official in Brussels, Dec. 2009.
59 Interview in Brussels, Jan. 2010.
60 The possibility of rehatting was explicitly mentioned in earlier documents on EU–UN cooperation (see n.3 above).
61 Interview with Council Secretariat official in Brussels, Jan. 2010.
10
Concluding Observations
This article has offered an overview of the political dynamics of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation. 
It was a promising concept, as a bridging operation to provide a linked intervention. During the 
planning of the operation, the EU and the UN also reached new milestones with joint fact-finding 
missions and permanent contacts and repeated visits between New York, Brussels and the Operation 
Headquarters  in  Paris.  Getting  the  Commission involved from the  very  beginning was  quite  a 
watershed for the EU internally as  well.  It  had tangible  effects  in  terms of  the  comprehensive 
approach, which foresaw not only a military presence, but also police trainers. Not only did the 
Commission pay for much of the parallel  MINURCAT deployment; it  also made its substantial  
experience with humanitarian aid available to EU member states. Finally, on a military level, the 
EU managed to deploy in a very remote area of operations with modest means.
Nevertheless, the operation was undermined by problems of a political nature. EUFOR led 
to a significant split between member states and created tensions in the relationship with the UN. 
One  official  downplayed  these  problems  as  'frictions',  which  are  part  of  any  multinational 
peacekeeping operation.62 Yet  it  was perhaps more fundamental  than that.  Due to  the problems 
within  the  EU about  EUFOR,  substantial  military  operations  in  Africa  in  the  near  future  have 
become unlikely.  The budgets  for  the  common costs  of  future  operations  will  likely be  small, 
thereby limiting ambitions. In addition, the EU is unlikely to plan an operation on the assumption 
that the UN will provide a parallel police-training mission. Further bridging operations are likely to 
be carried out in the future only if the EU has firm commitments about the military follow-on force. 
Yet,  given that many states are  reluctant  to host  UN peacekeepers,  the UN may not  be in  the 
position to give firm commitments in advance. All these things combined make it unlikely that a  
similar type of operation will  be undertaken in the near future. A more realistic concept  would 
include a much smaller European footprint that prepares the ground for the UN.63
The  disputes  had  to  do  not  only  with  conflicting  preferences,  but  also  with  a  lack  of 
understanding between the actors. A hostile view is that
Chad was a manufactured operation; it resulted from the desire of the new French President 
and Foreign Minister to present their ESDP credentials. It had nothing to do with a collective 
decision of the EU on the need to act in the light of a new crisis in Africa. That crisis had 
been going on for years, and then two new people arrived on the scene and decided for 
political reasons to promote some European activity.64 
Nobody doubts that France had an interest in the operation beyond humanitarian concerns, but to 
portray Bernard Kouchner – the co-founder of Médecins Sans Frontières, who had given most of his 
life to the humanitarian community – as politically motivated, is undoubtedly harsh. Germany and 
the UK were unwilling to accept that French policy might have been partly driven by a mixture of  
altruism and domestic  politics,  the  Darfur  conflict  being  a  hot  topic  in  the  French presidential 
elections.65
Similarly,  in  the  relationship  with  the  UN,  Déby's  resistance  to  UN peacekeepers  was 
significant, motivated by reasons of sovereignty and because it could weaken his position vis-à-vis 
the rebels and neighbouring states. It had taken French leverage and three high-level visits by UN 
personnel  as  well  as  a  bilateral  meeting  between  the  Secretary-General  and  Déby  to  get  the  
handover by MINURCAT established. Furthermore, the Chadian government asked MINURCAT 
62 Interview with national official in Brussels, Oct. 2009.
63 Interview with Council Secretariat official in Brussels, Jan. 2010.
64 British officer quoted in Luis Simón, 'Command and Control? Planning for EU military Operations', Occasional 
Paper No.81, EU Institute for Security Studies, Jan. 2010, p.36.
65 Mattelaer (see n.10 above), pp.15–16, quotes an official from a neutral EU state as saying 'by and large, we believe  
the French are honest about this and trying to do the right thing'.
11
not to renew its mandate in 2010. The EU cavilled at the UN's inability to get its force generation  
ready on time. But it was clear that the UN had its hands tied, and so handover problems should 
have been foreseeable.
EUFOR Tchad/RCA was a significant step in the development of the military side of the 
ESDP. It was the largest autonomous military operation to date and its area of operation was in a 
remote part of Africa. The EU learnt practical lessons in logistic support, reached new levels of day-
to-day cooperation  with  the  UN,  and applied  a  comprehensive  approach to  crisis  management 
through the various financial  instruments of  the Commission.  At  the same time the  experience 
exposed the limits of EU–UN cooperation and the selective military ambitions of some of EU 
member states.  This is  explained by the different  interests  of the actors,  and also by a  lack of  
understanding between different actors. Despite its promise as an experiment in bridging between 
operations EUFOR is therefore unlikely to be repeated in the near future.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This article has benefited from 15 in-depth interviews with officials from the EU member states, EU 
institutions and the UN, as well as a seminar on lessons learnt in Brussels.
